Jingyi Huang

about

I am an Assistant Professor in the Economic Department at Brandeis University.
My research lies at the intersection of economic history, law, and industrial organization. In particular, I study the long-term impact of regulations on competition and innovation, drawing on evidence from American history.

Email: jingyi.huang.econ at gmail.com

Curriculum Vitae

working papers

• Monopsony, Cartels, and Manipulation: Evidence from the U.S. Meatpacking Industry Download
  
  Abstract

  If a monopsony buyer manipulates market signals used by small sellers, it can create larger welfare loss than stated by standard models. This paper quantifies the effects of cartel signal manipulation on both the input and product markets by examining the U.S. meatpacking cartel from 1903 to 1917. The analyses leverage changes in antitrust enforcement that forced the cartel to stop manipulating market price signals and switch to a market share agreement. I quantify the welfare loss by comparing the observed market outcomes under the manipulation strategy with counterfactuals from the standard monopsony model without manipulation. Absent signal manipulation, wholesale cattle prices would increase by 23%, and 15,000 heads more cattle would be sold per week, while beef prices would be 6% lower and a household would save $3.6 per year.

• Fence Laws, Liability Rules, and Agricultural Productivity Download
  
  Abstract

  This paper uses the evolution of fence laws in the American West to show that liability assignment can influence resource allocation and productivity. Local fence laws assign animal trespassing liability to either farmers or livestock owners. I compiled a dataset documenting all county-level fence law changes from 1850 to 1930 for states on the Great Plains. I compare adjacent counties with different fence laws to identify the causal effect of fence laws on agricultural development. Results show that changing liability assignments had asymmetric effects. Shifting the liability from livestock owners to farmers decreased rural population density and farmland areas. On the other hand, shifting liability from farmers to livestock owners increased share of farmland used for wheat and corn, which led to higher total value of farm output. Reducing farmers' liability also shifted the composition of land acquisition by increasing the share of land acquired under Homestead as opposed to cash purchase.

• The Effect of Technological Innovation on Agricultural Production: Evidence from Mechanical Refrigeration in the U.S. Meatpacking Industry
  
  Abstract

  This paper analyzes the long-term effect of mechanical refrigeration, which differentially influenced perishable goods production such as livestock. The analysis exploits the variation in relative natural suitability for livestock versus grain production across counties to capture the impact of refrigeration on agricultural productivity. The baseline event-study shows that after 1880, when refrigeration was commercially adopted in the meatpacking industry, counties relatively more suitable for ranching than farming witnessed more farmland development and higher value of output. For every percentile increase in the relative suitability ranking, counties experienced a 0.1 percentage point increase in the share of land areas being developed as farmland, and a 0.5 percent increase in output value and land value. The effects also differ for counties across the range of relative suitability but persist over time. The results were driven primarily by the top two quartiles, but the effects on output and land value persisted until 1960.

publications

• The Impact of Innovation, Regulation, and Market Power on Economic Development: Evidence from the American West Download
  

  The Journal of Economic History, 83(2), 579-582, 2023. [Dissertation Summary].
  Awarded the Allan Nevins Prize for the best dissertation in North American economic history, 2022.
  Comments by Joshua Lewis

work in progress

• Interlocking Directorates and Railroad Collusion
• Liquidity Support, Banking Competition, and Welfare: Evidence from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in 1929