Jingyi Huang

about

I am an Assistant Professor in the Economic Department at Brandeis University.
My research lies at the intersection of economic history, law, and industrial organization. In particular, I study the long-term impact of regulations on competition and innovation, drawing on evidence from American history.

Email: jingyi.huang.econ at gmail.com

Curriculum Vitae

working papers

• Market Manipulation by a Monopsony Cartel: Evidence from the U.S. Meatpacking Industry
  Revision requested, AEJ:Micro
  
  Abstract

  If a monopsony buyer manipulates market signals used by small sellers, it can create larger welfare loss than stated by standard models. This paper quantifies the effects of cartel signal manipulation on both the input and product markets by examining the U.S. meatpacking cartel from 1903 to 1917. The analyses leverage changes in antitrust enforcement that forced the cartel to stop manipulating market price signals and switch to a market share agreement. I quantify the welfare loss by comparing the observed market outcomes under the manipulation strategy with counterfactuals from the standard monopsony model without manipulation. Absent signal manipulation, wholesale cattle prices would increase by 23%, and 15,000 heads more cattle would be sold per week, while beef prices would be 6% lower and a household would save $3.6 per year.

• Revisiting Adam Smith and the Division of Labor: New Evidence from U.S. Occupational Data, 1860–1940
  (with Nicholas Carollo and Elior Cohen)
  Revision requested, Review of Industrial Organization
  
  Abstract

  Using novel occupational data from the U.S. between 1860 and 1940, we evaluate three of Adam Smith's core propositions about the relationship between the division of labor, market size, innovation, and productivity. We first document significant growth in occupational diversity during this period using new measures of occupational specialization that we construct from workers' self-reported job titles in the decennial Census. Consistent with Smith's hypotheses, we find strong empirical evidence that occupational specialization increases with the extent of the market, is facilitated by technological innovation, and is ultimately associated with higher labor productivity. Our findings also extend Smith's narrative by highlighting the role of organizational changes and innovation spillovers during the Second Industrial Revolution. These results speak to the enduring relevance of Smith's insights in the context of an industrializing economy characterized by large firms, complex organizational structures, and rapid technological change.

• Fence Laws, Liability Rules, and Agricultural Productivity
  
  Abstract

  This paper uses the evolution of fence laws in the American West to show that liability assignment can influence resource allocation and productivity. Local fence laws assign animal trespassing liability to either farmers or livestock owners. I compiled a dataset documenting all county-level fence law changes from 1850 to 1930 for states on the Great Plains. I compare adjacent counties with different fence laws to identify the causal effect of fence laws on agricultural development. Results show that changing liability assignments had asymmetric effects. Shifting the liability from livestock owners to farmers decreased rural population density and farmland areas. On the other hand, shifting liability from farmers to livestock owners increased share of farmland used for wheat and corn, which led to higher total value of farm output. Reducing farmers' liability also shifted the composition of land acquisition by increasing the share of land acquired under Homestead as opposed to cash purchase.

publications

• The Impact of Innovation, Regulation, and Market Power on Economic Development: Evidence from the American West
  The Journal of Economic History, 83(2), 579-582, 2023. [Dissertation Summary] | Comments by Joshua Lewis
  Awarded the Allan Nevins Prize for the best dissertation in North American economic history, 2022.

work in progress

• Interlocking Directorates and Railroad Collusion
• Liquidity Support, Banking Competition, and Welfare: Evidence from the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta in 1929
  (with Jiwon Choi)
• New Work in the Second Industrial Revolution
  (with Nicholas Carollo and Elior Cohen)
  
  Abstract

  In the late 19th and early 20th century U.S., rapid technological and procedural innovation dramatically altered the task content of production, leading to the emergence and diffusion of new work activities and occupations. This paper uses the original write-in occupation and industry responses recorded on Census enumeration forms between 1860 and 1940 to identify granular job titles such as "comptometer operator" that existing Census classifications aggregate into broader categories. We document a set of novel facts about new occupations: where they first appeared, how quickly they diffused across labor markets and industries, and the characteristics of the workers who held them. We also study the relationship between technological innovation and adoption by comparing task descriptions of new occupations with the full text of all U.S. patent filed before 1940. While patenting activities became more geographically dispersed, new occupations often became more spatially concentrated before diffusing to other markets.

  | Slides